diff options
author | Miodrag Milanovic <mmicko@gmail.com> | 2015-11-08 12:56:12 +0100 |
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committer | Miodrag Milanovic <mmicko@gmail.com> | 2015-11-08 12:56:12 +0100 |
commit | 7c19aac60e12d6f5ea301bdb34d7826a01e0b06f (patch) | |
tree | f310d86aa2c6bfc19d115307dedde4eb0cd52dad /src/mame/machine/fd1094.cpp | |
parent | a57b46ae933badd7441ce1644711dbb851e2b504 (diff) |
Rename *.c -> *.cpp in our source (nw)
Diffstat (limited to 'src/mame/machine/fd1094.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | src/mame/machine/fd1094.cpp | 963 |
1 files changed, 963 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/mame/machine/fd1094.cpp b/src/mame/machine/fd1094.cpp new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ce1abbfad92 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/mame/machine/fd1094.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,963 @@ +// license:BSD-3-Clause +// copyright-holders:Nicola Salmoria, Andreas Naive, Charles MacDonald +/*************************************************************************** + + Hitachi FD1089FD1094 encryption emulation + +**************************************************************************** + + Copyright Nicola Salmoria, Andreas Naive, and Charles MacDonald. + + All rights reserved. + +**************************************************************************** + + The FD1094 is a custom CPU based on the 68000, which runs encrypted code. + The decryption key is stored in 8KB of battery-backed RAM; when the battery + dies, the CPU can no longer decrypt the program code and the game stops + working (though the CPU itself still works - it just uses a wrong decryption + key). + + Being a 68000, the encryption works on 16-bit words. Only words fetched from + program space are decrypted; words fetched from data space are not affected. + + The decryption can logically be split in two parts. The first part consists + of a series of conditional XORs and bitswaps, controlled by the decryption + key, which will be described in the next paragraph. The second part does a replacement + of several values with FFFF. This last step is done to prevent usage of any + PC-relative opcode, which would easily allow an intruder to dump decrypted + values from program space. The FFFF replacement may affect either ~300 values + or ~5000, depending on the decryption key. + + The main part of the decryption can itself be subdivided in five consecutive + steps. The first one is executed only if bit 15 of the encrypted value is 1; + the second one only if bit 14 of the _current_ value is 1; the third one only + if bit 13 of the current value is 1; the fourth one is executed whenever one + of the first three has been executed; the fifth one is always executed. Every + step can be thought as consisting of a serie of operations, with some steps + avoiding some of them: a unconditional bitswap, some conditional XORs, + a unconditional XOR and some conditional bitswaps. + + In the end, the decryption of a value at a given address is controlled by 32 + boolean variables; 8 of them change at every address (repeating after 0x2000 + words), and constitute the main key which is stored in the battery-backed + RAM; the other 24 don't change with the address, and depend solely on bytes + 1, 2, and 3 of the battery-backed RAM, modified by the "state" which the CPU + is in. + + The CPU can be in one of 256 possible states. The 8 bits of the state modify + the 24 bits of the global key in a fixed way, which isn't affected by the + battery-backed RAM. + On reset, the CPU goes in state 0x00. The state can then be modified by the + program, executing the instruction + CMPI.L #$00xxFFFF, D0 + where xx is the state. + When an interrupt happens, the CPU enters "irq mode", forcing a specific + state, which is stored in byte 0 of the battery-backed RAM. Irq mode can also + be selected by the program with the instruction + CMPI.L #$0200FFFF, D0 + When RTE is executed, the CPU leaves irq mode, restoring the previous state. + This can also be done by the program with the instruction + CMPI.L #$0300FFFF, D0 + + Since bytes 0-3 of the battery-backed RAM are used to store the irq state and + the global key, they have a double use: this one, and the normal 8-bit key + that changes at every address. To prevent that double use, the CPU fetches + the 8-bit key from a different place when decrypting words 0-3, but this only + happens after wrapping around at least once; when decrypting the first four + words of memory, which correspond to the initial SP and initial PC vectors, + the 8-bit key is taken from bytes 0-3 of RAM. Instead, when fetching the + vectors, the global key is handled differently, to prevent double use of + those bytes. But this special handling of the global key doesn't apply to + normal operations: reading words 1-3 from program space results in bytes 1-3 + of RAM being used both for the 8-bit key and for the 24-bit global key. + + + + There is still uncertainty about the assignment of two global key bits. + + key[1] + ------ + key_0b invert; \ bits 7,5 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU) + global_xor0; / + key_5b invert; bit 6 + key_2b invert; bit 4 + key_1b invert; bit 3 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU) + global_xor1; bit 2 + key_0c invert; bit 1 + global_swap2; bit 0 + + key[2] + ------ + key_1a invert; bit 7 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU) + key_6b invert; bit 6 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU) + global_swap0a; bit 5 + key_7a invert; bit 4 + key_4a invert; bit 3 + global_swap0b; bit 2 + key_6a invert; bit 1 + key_3a invert; bit 0 + + key[3] + ------ + key_2a invert; bit 7 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU) + global_swap3; bit 6 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU) + key_5a_invert; bit 5 + global_swap1; bit 4 + key_3b invert; bit 3 + global_swap4; bit 2 + key_0a invert; bit 1 + key_4b invert; bit 0 + + + Analysis of the data contained in the 8k key data indicates some regularities. + To begin with, in all the keys seen so far, bit 7 ($80) in key values at + addresses $0004-$0FFF is always set to 1. Similarly, bit 6 ($40) in key values + at addresses $1000-$1FFF is always set to 1. + + Even more interesting, however, is that analyzing the low 6 bits of the key + data reveals that a simple linear congruential generator has been used + consistently to generate the key bits. The LCG is of the form: + + temp = A * val; + val' = temp + (temp << 16); + + and it appears to be calculated to at least 22 bits. In all cases seen so far, + the value of 'A' is fixed at $29. To generate the low 6 bits of the key, the + result of the LCG is shifted right 16 bits and inverted. + + The following pseudo-code will generate 7 of the 8 bits of the key data + successfully for all known keys, given the values of the 'shift' and 'B' + parameters, as well as an initial 'seed' for the generator: + + void genkey(UINT32 seed, UINT8 *output) + { + int bytenum; + + for (bytenum = 4; bytenum < 8192; bytenum++) + { + UINT8 byteval; + + seed = seed * 0x29; + seed += seed << 16; + + byteval = (~seed >> 16) & 0x3f; + byteval |= (bytenum < 0x1000) ? 0x80 : 0x40; + + output[bytenum] = byteval; + } + } + + This only leaves one bit per key value (and the global key) left to determine. + It is worth pointing out that this remaining bit is the same bit that controls + how many opcodes to blank to $FFFF: 0 means a smaller subset (~300), while 1 + indicates a much larger subset (~5000). Looking at the correlations between + where the key has this bit set to 0, and the presence of opcodes that would + be blanked as a result, seems to imply that the key is generated based on the + plaintext. That is, this final bit is set to 1 by default (hence blanking + more aggressively), and cleared to 0 if any plaintext words affected by the + byte in question would be incorrectly blanked. + + + When the keys were generated, the LCG seed wasn't input directly. Instead, + another value was entered, which in most cases was derived from the current + date/time. The LCG seed is obtained from that value via a multiplication. + The current date/time was also used in most cases to select the three bytes of + the global key. Interestingly, the global key must be inverted and read in + decimal representation to see this, while the seed must be read in hexadecimal + representation. + + For some reason, bit 3 of the first byte of the global key was always set to 1 + regardless of the value input into the key generator program, so e.g. the + input "88 01 23" would become "80 01 23". + + The very first byte of internal RAM, which indicates the IRQ state, doesn't + seem to follow the same procedure. The IRQ state was probably decided at an + earlier time, not during the final key generation. + + + summary: + -------- + + +----------------------------------------------------- 317- part # + | +--------------------------------------------- IRQ state (hex) + | | +--------------------------------------- global key (inverted, dec) + | | | +------------------------------ main key seed (hex) (LCG seed = seed * 0x2F1E21) + | | | | +--------------------- game + | | | | | +------------ year + | | | | | | +- inferred key generation date + | | | | | | | + -------- -- -------- ------ -------- ---- ----------------------------- + 0041 12 87 06 19 895963 bullet 1987 87/06/19 (atypical) + 0045 34 97 02 39 384694 suprleag 1987 (atypical) + 0046 E3 87 10 07 012563 hwchampj 1987 87/10/07 (atypical) + 0049 F1 87 10 28 8932F7 shinobi2 1987 87/10/28 (atypical) + 0050 F1 87 10 28 8932F7 shinobi1 1987 87/10/28 (atypical) + 0053 00 00 00 00 020000 sonicbom 1987 atypical + 0056 CD 80 01 23 032ABC thndrbld 1987 88/01/23 (atypical) + 0059 45 80 03 30 343210 aceattac 1988 88/03/30 (atypical) + 0060 45 80 03 30 343210 aceattaca 1988 88/03/30 (atypical) + 0065 FC 80 06 06 880606 altbeastj1 1988 88/06/06 + 0068 20 80 06 10 880610 altbeastj3 1988 88/06/10 + 0069 20 80 06 10 880610 altbeast5 1998 88/06/10 + 0070 59 80 08 06 880806 passshtj 1988 88/08/06 + 0074 47 80 08 06 880806 passshta 1988 88/08/06 + 0071 20 80 08 09 880809 passsht 1988 88/08/09 + 0079 98 80 09 05 880906 exctleag 1988 88/09/05-88/09/06 (atypical) + 0080 96 80 08 26 880826 passsht 1988 88/08/26 + 0058-02C FF 80 10 07 881007 sspirtfc 1988 88/10/07 + 0084 0E 80 10 31 881031 wb31 1988 88/10/31 + 0085 26 80 11 08 881108 wb32 1988 88/11/08 + 0087 69 80 11 08 881108 wb34 1988 88/11/08 + 0089 52 80 11 29 881129 wb33 1988 88/11/29 + 0058-03B 71 80 11 25 881125 ggroundj 1988 88/11/25 + 0058-03C 04 80 11 27 881127 gground 1988 88/11/27 + 0090 AB 80 01 27 247333 wrestwar1 1989 atypical + 0091 68 80 11 27 881127 tetris1 1988 88/11/27 + 0092 10 80 11 28 881128 tetris2 1988 88/11/28 + 0093 25 80 11 29 881129 tetris 1988 88/11/29 + 0093A 35 02 09 17 900209 tetris3 1988 90/02/09 + 0096 21 80 11 21 881121 ddux 1988 88/11/21 + 0102 AB 80 02 03 04588A wrestwar2 1989 atypical + 0058-04B 27 03 27 14 032714 crkdownj 1989 89/03/27 14:xx + 0058-04C 19 03 27 05 032705 crkdown 1989 89/03/27 05:xx + 0058-04D DC 03 27 06 032706 crkdownu 1989 89/03/27 06:xx + 0110 19 81 03 29 032916 goldnaxe1 1989 89/03/29 16:xx + 0115 12 04 05 11 040511 bayroutej 1989 89/04/05 11:xx + 0116 11 03 30 09 033009 bayroute 1989 89/03/30 09:xx + 0118 22 81 03 07 030719 toutrun 1989 89/03/07 19:xx + toutrun2 22 81 03 07 031113 toutrun2 1989 89/03/11 13:xx (atypical) + 0120 0D 81 03 29 032916 goldnaxe3 1989 89/03/29 16:xx + 0121 35 81 03 29 032916 goldnaxej 1989 89/03/29 16:xx + 0122 03 81 04 04 890404 goldnaxeu 1989 89/04/04 + 0058-05B 92 81 06 09 890609 sgmastj 1989 89/06/09 + 0058-05C 30 81 06 13 890613 sgmastc 1989 89/06/13 + 0058-05D 50 81 06 09 890609 sgmast 1989 89/06/09 + 0124A 80 06 21 11 890621 smgpj 1989 89/06/21 11:xx + 0125A DE 06 15 16 890615 smgpu 1989 89/06/15 16:xx + 0126 54 05 28 01 890528 smgp5 1989 89/05/28 01:xx + 0126A 74 06 16 15 890616 smgp 1989 89/06/16 15:xx + 0127A 5F 81 07 06 890706 fpoint 1989 89/07/06 + 0127A 5F 81 07 06 890706 fpoint1 1989 89/07/06 + 0128 55 00 28 20 890828 eswatj 1989 89/08/28 20:xx + 0129 0A 00 28 20 890828 eswatu 1989 89/08/28 20:xx + 0130 EC 00 28 19 890828 eswat 1989 89/08/28 19:xx + 0134 DE 81 11 30 891130 loffirej 1989 89/11/30 + 0135 98 81 11 31 891131 loffireu 1989 89/11/31 + 0136 12 81 11 29 891129 loffire 1989 89/11/29 + 0139 49 03 25 15 891125 bloxeed 1990 89/11/25 15:xx + 0142 91 01 24 17 900124 mvpj 1989 90/01/24 17:xx + 0143 20 02 02 18 900202 mvp 1989 90/02/02 18:xx + 0144 2E 02 23 18 022318 rachero 1989 90/02/23 18:xx + 0058-06B 88 03 15 09 900315 roughrac 1990 90/03/15 09:xx + 0146 10 04 26 17 900426 astormj 1990 90/04/26 17:xx + 0147 2D 04 14 14 900414 astormu 1990 90/04/14 14:xx + 0148 50 04 26 15 900426 astorm3 1990 90/04/26 15:xx + 0153 FC 04 10 14 900410 pontoon 1990 90/04/10 14:xx + 0154 ED 05 01 13 900501 astorm 1990 90/05/01 13:xx + 0157 20 07 20 10 900720 mwalkj 1990 90/07/20 10:xx + 0158 DE 07 15 15 900715 mwalku 1990 90/07/15 15:xx + 0159 39 07 20 10 900720 mwalk 1990 90/07/20 10:xx + 0162 8F 01 14 15 900914 gprider1 1990 90/09/14 15:xx + 0163 99 01 13 15 900913 gprider 1990 90/09/13 15:xx + 5023 EF 04 18 05 900917 ryukyu 1990 90/09/17 12:18? (atypical) + 0165 56 82 11 25 901125 lghostu 1990 90/11/25 + 0166 A2 82 11 24 901124 lghost 1990 90/11/24 + 0169B 48 06 35 32 901205 abcop 1990 90/12/05 14:35? (atypical) + 0058-08B 4E 04 17 15 910206 qsww 1991 91/02/06 12:17? (atypical) + 0175 91 83 03 22 910322 cltchitrj 1991 91/03/22 + 0176 FC 83 03 14 910314 cltchitr 1991 91/03/14 + 0179B 73 06 55 17 910318 cottonj 1991 91/03/18 14:55? (atypical) + 0180 73 03 53 00 910403 cottonu 1991 91/04/03 11:53? (atypical) + 0181A 73 06 55 17 910318 cotton 1991 91/03/18 14:55? (atypical) + 0058-09D 91 83 06 26 910618 dcclubfd 1991 91/06/18-91/06/26 (atypical) + 0182 07 07 12 14 921401 ddcrewj2 1991 92/07/12 14:01? (atypical) + 0184 07 07 12 16 921622 ddcrew2 1991 92/07/12 16:22? (atypical) + 0185 91 07 06 16 910704 ddcrewj 1991 91/07/04-91/07/06 16:xx (atypical) + 0186 5F 83 07 01 912030 ddcrewu 1991 91/07/01 20:30? (atypical) + 0187 91 84 07 42 910744 ddcrew1 1991 92/07/xx 07:44? (atypical) + 0190 07 07 17 16 921716 ddcrew 1992 92/07/07 17:16? (atypical) + 0194 4A 07 10 13 920623 desertbrj 1992 92/06/23 07:10? (atypical) + 0196 4A 20 12 22 920623 desertbr 1992 92/06/23 20:12? (atypical) + 0197A 3F 84 06 19 920612 wwallyja 1992 92/06/12-92/06/19 (atypical) + 0197B 3F 84 06 19 920612 wwallyj 1992 92/06/12-92/06/19 (atypical) + + ---- + + Bad CPUs that gave some more information about the global key: + + global01 global02 global03 + -------- -------- -------- + ..... .. .. + unknown 11111111 11110110 10111110 (Shinobi 16A, part no. unreadable, could be dead) + unknown 10101011 11111000 11010101 (unknown ddcrewa key) + dead 00001111 00001111 00001111 (Alien Storm CPU with no battery) + bad 11100000 10101011 10111001 (flaky 317-0049) + + ---- + + Notes: + + We start in state 0. + Vectors are fetched: + SP.HI @ $000000 -> mainkey = key[0], globalkey = { $00, $00, $00 }, less aggressive blanking + SP.LO @ $000002 -> mainkey = key[1], globalkey = { $00, $00, $00 }, less aggressive blanking + PC.HI @ $000004 -> mainkey = key[2], globalkey = { key[1], $00, $00 } + PC.LO @ $000006 -> mainkey = key[3], globalkey = { key[1], key[2], $00 } + + driver FD1094 SP plain SP enc PC plain PC enc States Used (majority one marked with asterisk, if known) + -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------------------- + aceattac 317-0059 00000000 A711AF59 00000414 AF59AACD 00 12 17 31 45 90 FC* + aceattaca 317-0060 00000000 A711AF59 00000400 AF59EADD 00 17 31 45 90 FC* + altbeast5 317-0069 FFFFFF00 B2F7F299 00000400 CCDDEF58 00 0F 18 20 93* A7 D8 + altbeastj1 317-0065 FFFFFF00 C9C5F299 00000400 CCDDECDD 00 09 12 67* 99 FC + altbeastj3 317-0068 FFFFFF00 B2F7F299 00000400 CCDDEF58 00 0F 18 20 93* A7 D8 + astorm 317-0154 FFFFFF00 B297F23F 00000400 BD5999DD 00 1F 48* 5F 66 ED + astorm3 317-0148 FFFFFF00 ED9FF23F 00000400 FC58B9DC 00 06 36 50 CC D9* + astormj 317-0146 FFFFFF00 ED8CF23F 00000400 FC58BC59 00 10 29* 44 CE DF + astormu 317-0147 FFFFFF00 B297F23F 00000400 55334533 00 19 2D 46 58* DF + bayroute 317-0116 00504000 5EB40000 00001000 5533A184 00 04* 11 18 + bayroutej 317-0115 00504000 56150000 00001000 85948DCF 00 05* 12 16 + bloxeed 317-0139 00000000 5D92A711 00001D38 BD59FFE8 00 49 53 55 56* DF + bullet 317-0041 00000000 57355D96 00001882 8DDC8CF4 00 12 21 69* FE + cltchitr 317-0176 00000000 A711A711 00000416 AF59EBCD 00 01* 80 FC + cltchitrj 317-0175 00000000 5F94A711 00000416 AF59AFFB 00 03 19* 91 + cotton 317-0181a 00204000 5DB20000 00000716 CCDD0716 00 0E* 73 + cottonj 317-0179b 00204000 5DB20000 00000720 CCDD0720 00 0E* 73 + cottonu 317-0180 00204000 5DB20000 00000716 A1840716 00 0E* 73 + ddcrew 317-0190 00000000 AF595D92 00000408 BD59FD7F 00 07 16* 17 + ddcrew1 317-0187 00000000 5F945D96 00000408 8DDCE758 00 04 07* 13 91 + ddcrew2 317-0184 00000000 AF595D92 00000408 5533FD7F 00 07 12* 16 22 + ddcrewj 317-0185 00000000 5F945D92 00000408 5533FD7F 00 06 07* 09 91 + ddcrewu 317-0186 00000000 AF59A711 00000408 8DDCC381 00 01 07 5F 91* + ddux 317-0096 00000000 5F94AF59 00000406 AF5987A0 00 21 28 70* D9 + desertbr 317-0196 00000000 55335D92 00001838 5533F46A 00 3C 4A 82 DA* + desertbrj 317-0194 00000000 55335D92 00001838 BD59E720 00 3C 4A 82 DA* + eswat 317-0130 00000000 A711AF59 00000400 5533BC59 00 05 0C EC FA* + eswatj 317-0128 00000000 A711AF59 00000400 55334735 00 55 63 CB* D5 + eswatu 317-0129 00000000 5537AF59 00000400 55334735 00 0A 12 C3* CC + exctleag 317-0079 00000000 5537AF59 00000410 83018384 00 02 39 4B 85 98 E5* + fpoint 317-0127a 00000000 AF59AF59 00001A40 8DDC9960 00 15* 35 5F 82 DB + fpoint1 317-0127a 00000000 AF59AF59 00001A40 8DDC9960 00 15* 35 5F 82 DB + goldnaxe1 317-0110 FFFFFF00 ED62F2B9 00000400 AF59A785 00 19 2E 31 48* 5D + goldnaxe3 317-0120 FFFFFF00 ED62F2B9 00000400 AF59A785 00 0A 0D 44 C7 EF* + goldnaxej 317-0121 FFFFFF00 C9D6F2B9 00000400 AF59A785 00 12* 35 58 7A 9E + goldnaxeu 317-0122 FFFFFF00 E53AF2B9 00000400 A184A196 00 03 51* 72 99 F6 + hwchampj 317-0046 00000000 5D925D96 000008AC AF59AA41 00 8B* E3 + lghost 317-0166 00000000 5F94A711 00000404 EE588241 00 A2 DC E0* + lghostu 317-0165 00000000 AF59A711 00000404 EE58C340 00 56 C4 DE* + mvp 317-0143 00000000 5F94A711 00000416 BD59DC5B 00 19* 20 88 98 + mwalk 317-0159 FFFFFF00 C9C7F23F 00000400 5533BD7F 00 39 51* AA CC + mwalkj 317-0157 FFFFFF00 B2F7F23F 00000400 5533BD7F 00 20 88 99 CF* + mwalku 317-0158 FFFFFF00 C572F23F 00000400 8DDC8DDD 00 49* 90 C0 DE + passsht 317-0080 00000000 AF59AF59 00003202 C2003923 00 11 52* 96 EE + passshta 317-0074 00000000 AF59AF59 000031E4 C2003F8C 00 12* 47 83 A7 + passshtj 317-0070 00000000 5D92AF59 000031E4 C2003F8C 00 12 59 83* FE + pontoon 317-0153 00000000 A7115D92 00000E0C FC585979 00 19 70 DC* FC + ryukyu 317-5023 00203800 AF49D30B 0000042E FC5863B5 00 DC* EF + shinobi2 317-0049 FFFFFF00 C9C5F25F 00000400 AF598395 00 53 88 98 9B 9C* F1 + sonicbom 317-0053 00000000 5735AF59 00001000 FC587133 00* + suprleag 317-0045 00000000 A711AF59 0000108E BD59CE5B 00 12* 34 56 AB CD + tetris1 317-0091 00000000 5D92AF59 00000410 AF59AE58 99 25 42 5B 68 FC + tetris2 317-0092 00000000 5735AF59 00000410 AF598685 00 10 52 74 97* FC + wb32 317-0085 FFFFFF7E B2F78997 00000500 AF590500 00 10 13 26 77 + wb33 317-0089 FFFFFF7E E5C78997 00000500 AF590500 00 23 40 52 71* + wb34 317-0087 FFFFFF7E B2978997 00000500 AF590500 00 11* 64 69 82 + wrestwar1 317-0090 00000000 5D96AF59 00000414 8301AE18 00 12* A7 AB CC F9 FC + wrestwar2 317-0102 00000000 5D96AF59 00000414 EE588E5B 00 12* A7 AB CC F9 FC + wwallyj 317-0197b 00000000 AF595D96 00000416 CCDDCE5B 00 16* 32 3F 43 + wwallyja 317-0197a 00000000 AF595D96 00000416 CCDDCE5B 00 16* 32 3F 43 + +*****************************************************************************/ + +#include "emu.h" +#include "fd1094.h" + + +//************************************************************************** +// CONSTANTS +//************************************************************************** + +// device type definition +const device_type FD1094 = &device_creator<fd1094_device>; + +/* +317-0162 CPU also needs to mask: +0x107a, +0x127a, +0x147a, +0x167a, +0x187a, +0x1a7a, +0x1c7a, +0x1e7a, +this only happens with 317-0162 so far; I assume it is a fault in the CPU. +*/ +const UINT16 fd1094_device::s_masked_opcodes[] = +{ + 0x013a,0x033a,0x053a,0x073a,0x083a,0x093a,0x0b3a,0x0d3a,0x0f3a, + + 0x103a, 0x10ba,0x10fa, 0x113a,0x117a,0x11ba,0x11fa, + 0x123a, 0x12ba,0x12fa, 0x133a,0x137a,0x13ba,0x13fa, + 0x143a, 0x14ba,0x14fa, 0x153a,0x157a,0x15ba, + 0x163a, 0x16ba,0x16fa, 0x173a,0x177a,0x17ba, + 0x183a, 0x18ba,0x18fa, 0x193a,0x197a,0x19ba, + 0x1a3a, 0x1aba,0x1afa, 0x1b3a,0x1b7a,0x1bba, + 0x1c3a, 0x1cba,0x1cfa, 0x1d3a,0x1d7a,0x1dba, + 0x1e3a, 0x1eba,0x1efa, 0x1f3a,0x1f7a,0x1fba, + + 0x203a,0x207a,0x20ba,0x20fa, 0x213a,0x217a,0x21ba,0x21fa, + 0x223a,0x227a,0x22ba,0x22fa, 0x233a,0x237a,0x23ba,0x23fa, + 0x243a,0x247a,0x24ba,0x24fa, 0x253a,0x257a,0x25ba, + 0x263a,0x267a,0x26ba,0x26fa, 0x273a,0x277a,0x27ba, + 0x283a,0x287a,0x28ba,0x28fa, 0x293a,0x297a,0x29ba, + 0x2a3a,0x2a7a,0x2aba,0x2afa, 0x2b3a,0x2b7a,0x2bba, + 0x2c3a,0x2c7a,0x2cba,0x2cfa, 0x2d3a,0x2d7a,0x2dba, + 0x2e3a,0x2e7a,0x2eba,0x2efa, 0x2f3a,0x2f7a,0x2fba, + + 0x303a,0x307a,0x30ba,0x30fa, 0x313a,0x317a,0x31ba,0x31fa, + 0x323a,0x327a,0x32ba,0x32fa, 0x333a,0x337a,0x33ba,0x33fa, + 0x343a,0x347a,0x34ba,0x34fa, 0x353a,0x357a,0x35ba, + 0x363a,0x367a,0x36ba,0x36fa, 0x373a,0x377a,0x37ba, + 0x383a,0x387a,0x38ba,0x38fa, 0x393a,0x397a,0x39ba, + 0x3a3a,0x3a7a,0x3aba,0x3afa, 0x3b3a,0x3b7a,0x3bba, + 0x3c3a,0x3c7a,0x3cba,0x3cfa, 0x3d3a,0x3d7a,0x3dba, + 0x3e3a,0x3e7a,0x3eba,0x3efa, 0x3f3a,0x3f7a,0x3fba, + + 0x41ba,0x43ba,0x44fa,0x45ba,0x46fa,0x47ba,0x49ba,0x4bba,0x4cba,0x4cfa,0x4dba,0x4fba, + + 0x803a,0x807a,0x80ba,0x80fa, 0x81fa, + 0x823a,0x827a,0x82ba,0x82fa, 0x83fa, + 0x843a,0x847a,0x84ba,0x84fa, 0x85fa, + 0x863a,0x867a,0x86ba,0x86fa, 0x87fa, + 0x883a,0x887a,0x88ba,0x88fa, 0x89fa, + 0x8a3a,0x8a7a,0x8aba,0x8afa, 0x8bfa, + 0x8c3a,0x8c7a,0x8cba,0x8cfa, 0x8dfa, + 0x8e3a,0x8e7a,0x8eba,0x8efa, 0x8ffa, + + 0x903a,0x907a,0x90ba,0x90fa, 0x91fa, + 0x923a,0x927a,0x92ba,0x92fa, 0x93fa, + 0x943a,0x947a,0x94ba,0x94fa, 0x95fa, + 0x963a,0x967a,0x96ba,0x96fa, 0x97fa, + 0x983a,0x987a,0x98ba,0x98fa, 0x99fa, + 0x9a3a,0x9a7a,0x9aba,0x9afa, 0x9bfa, + 0x9c3a,0x9c7a,0x9cba,0x9cfa, 0x9dfa, + 0x9e3a,0x9e7a,0x9eba,0x9efa, 0x9ffa, + + 0xb03a,0xb07a,0xb0ba,0xb0fa, 0xb1fa, + 0xb23a,0xb27a,0xb2ba,0xb2fa, 0xb3fa, + 0xb43a,0xb47a,0xb4ba,0xb4fa, 0xb5fa, + 0xb63a,0xb67a,0xb6ba,0xb6fa, 0xb7fa, + 0xb83a,0xb87a,0xb8ba,0xb8fa, 0xb9fa, + 0xba3a,0xba7a,0xbaba,0xbafa, 0xbbfa, + 0xbc3a,0xbc7a,0xbcba,0xbcfa, 0xbdfa, + 0xbe3a,0xbe7a,0xbeba,0xbefa, 0xbffa, + + 0xc03a,0xc07a,0xc0ba,0xc0fa, 0xc1fa, + 0xc23a,0xc27a,0xc2ba,0xc2fa, 0xc3fa, + 0xc43a,0xc47a,0xc4ba,0xc4fa, 0xc5fa, + 0xc63a,0xc67a,0xc6ba,0xc6fa, 0xc7fa, + 0xc83a,0xc87a,0xc8ba,0xc8fa, 0xc9fa, + 0xca3a,0xca7a,0xcaba,0xcafa, 0xcbfa, + 0xcc3a,0xcc7a,0xccba,0xccfa, 0xcdfa, + 0xce3a,0xce7a,0xceba,0xcefa, 0xcffa, + + 0xd03a,0xd07a,0xd0ba,0xd0fa, 0xd1fa, + 0xd23a,0xd27a,0xd2ba,0xd2fa, 0xd3fa, + 0xd43a,0xd47a,0xd4ba,0xd4fa, 0xd5fa, + 0xd63a,0xd67a,0xd6ba,0xd6fa, 0xd7fa, + 0xd83a,0xd87a,0xd8ba,0xd8fa, 0xd9fa, + 0xda3a,0xda7a,0xdaba,0xdafa, 0xdbfa, + 0xdc3a,0xdc7a,0xdcba,0xdcfa, 0xddfa, + 0xde3a,0xde7a,0xdeba,0xdefa, 0xdffa +}; + + + + +//************************************************************************** +// DECRYPTION CACHE HELPER +//************************************************************************** + +//------------------------------------------------- +// fd1094_decryption_cache - constructor +//------------------------------------------------- + +fd1094_decryption_cache::fd1094_decryption_cache(fd1094_device &fd1094) + : m_fd1094(fd1094), + m_baseaddress(0), + m_size(0), + m_rgnoffset(0) +{ + reset(); +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// reset - reset the cache +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_decryption_cache::reset() +{ + // reset all allocated cache buffers + for (int cache = 0; cache < 256; cache++) + m_decrypted_opcodes[cache].clear(); +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// configure - configure the address and size +// of the region we are caching +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_decryption_cache::configure(offs_t baseaddress, UINT32 size, offs_t rgnoffset) +{ + // if something important changes, throw away what we have + if (m_baseaddress != baseaddress || m_size != size || m_rgnoffset != rgnoffset) + { + m_baseaddress = baseaddress; + m_size = size; + m_rgnoffset = rgnoffset; + reset(); + } +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// decrypted_opcodes - return a pointer to the +// decrypted opcodes for the given state +//------------------------------------------------- + +UINT16 *fd1094_decryption_cache::decrypted_opcodes(UINT8 state) +{ + // if we have already decrypted this state, use it + if (!m_decrypted_opcodes[state].empty()) + return &m_decrypted_opcodes[state][0]; + + // otherwise, allocate and decrypt + m_decrypted_opcodes[state].resize(0x200000/2); + memset(&m_decrypted_opcodes[state][0], 0, 0x200000); + m_fd1094.decrypt(m_baseaddress, m_size, m_rgnoffset, &m_decrypted_opcodes[state][0], state); + return &m_decrypted_opcodes[state][0]; +} + + + +//************************************************************************** +// CORE IMPLEMENTATION +//************************************************************************** + +//------------------------------------------------- +// fd1094_device - constructor +//------------------------------------------------- + + +fd1094_device::fd1094_device(const machine_config &mconfig, const char *tag, device_t *owner, UINT32 clock) + : m68000_device(mconfig, tag, owner, clock, "fd1094", __FILE__), + m_decrypted_opcodes_bank(*this, "^fd1094_decrypted_opcodes"), + m_state(0x00), + m_irqmode(false), + m_cache(*this), + m_srcbase(NULL), + m_srcbytes(0), + m_key(NULL) +{ + // override the name after the m68000 initializes + m_name.assign("FD1094"); + + // add the decrypted opcodes map +// m_address_map[AS_DECRYPTED_OPCODES] = ADDRESS_MAP_NAME(decrypted_opcodes_map); + + // create the initial masked opcode table + memset(m_masked_opcodes_lookup, 0, sizeof(m_masked_opcodes_lookup)); + for (int index = 0; index < ARRAY_LENGTH(s_masked_opcodes); index++) + { + UINT16 opcode = s_masked_opcodes[index]; + m_masked_opcodes_lookup[0][opcode >> 4] |= 1 << ((opcode >> 1) & 7); + m_masked_opcodes_lookup[1][opcode >> 4] |= 1 << ((opcode >> 1) & 7); + } + + // add some more opcodes for the more aggressive table + for (int opcode = 0; opcode < 65536; opcode += 2) + if ((opcode & 0xff80) == 0x4e80 || (opcode & 0xf0f8) == 0x50c8 || (opcode & 0xf000) == 0x6000) + m_masked_opcodes_lookup[1][opcode >> 4] |= 1 << ((opcode >> 1) & 7); + + m_state_change = state_change_delegate(FUNC(fd1094_device::default_state_change), this); +} + + + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// change_state - set the current state of the +// chip +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_device::change_state(int newstate) +{ + // adjust state and IRQ mode + switch (newstate & 0x300) + { + case 0x0000: // 0x00xx: select state xx + m_state = newstate & 0xff; + break; + + case STATE_RESET: // 0x01xx: select state xx and exit irq mode + m_state = newstate & 0xff; + m_irqmode = false; + break; + + case STATE_IRQ: // 0x02xx: enter irq mode + m_irqmode = true; + break; + + case STATE_RTE: // 0x03xx: exit irq mode + m_irqmode = false; + break; + } + + // notify of the state change + m_state_change(state()); + + // force a flush of the prefetch cache on any state change + set_state_int(M68K_PREF_ADDR, 0x0010); +} + + + +//************************************************************************** +// DEVICE OVERRIDES +//************************************************************************** + +//------------------------------------------------- +// device_start - one-time device initialization +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_device::device_start() +{ + // find the key + m_key = memregion("key")->base(); + if (m_key == NULL) + throw emu_fatalerror("FD1094 key region not found!"); + + // get a pointer to the ROM region + if (region() != NULL) + { + m_srcbase = reinterpret_cast<UINT16 *>(region()->base()); + m_srcbytes = region()->bytes(); + } + + // if no ROM region, see if there's a memory share with our name + else + { + memory_share *share = owner()->memshare(tag()); + if (share != NULL) + { + m_srcbase = reinterpret_cast<UINT16 *>(share->ptr()); + m_srcbytes = share->bytes(); + } + } + + // if we got nothing, error + if (m_srcbase == NULL) + throw emu_fatalerror("FD1094 found no data to decrypt!"); + + // determine length and configure our cache + m_cache.configure(0x000000, m_srcbytes, 0x000000); + change_state(STATE_RESET); + + // start the base device + m68000_device::device_start(); + + // register for the state changing callbacks we need in the m68000 + set_cmpild_callback(write32_delegate(FUNC(fd1094_device::cmp_callback),this)); + set_rte_callback(write_line_delegate(FUNC(fd1094_device::rte_callback),this)); + static_set_irq_acknowledge_callback(*this, device_irq_acknowledge_delegate(FUNC(fd1094_device::irq_callback), this)); + + // save state + save_item(NAME(m_state)); + save_item(NAME(m_irqmode)); +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// device_reset - one-time device initialization +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_device::device_reset() +{ + // flush the cache and switch to the reset state + m_cache.reset(); + change_state(STATE_RESET); + fprintf(stderr, "reset done\n"); + // reset the parent + m68000_device::device_reset(); +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// device_postload - post restore initialization +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_device::device_postload() +{ + // refresh the state + m_state_change(state()); +} + + + +//************************************************************************** +// INTERNAL HELPERS +//************************************************************************** + +//------------------------------------------------- +// decrypt_one - decrypt a single opcode given +// the address, data, and keys; note that the +// address provided is the word address +// (physical address / 2) +//------------------------------------------------- + +UINT16 fd1094_device::decrypt_one(offs_t address, UINT16 val, const UINT8 *main_key, UINT8 state, bool vector_fetch) +{ + // extract and adjust the global key + UINT8 gkey1 = main_key[1]; + UINT8 gkey2 = main_key[2]; + UINT8 gkey3 = main_key[3]; + if (state & 0x0001) + { + gkey1 ^= 0x04; // global_xor1 + gkey2 ^= 0x80; // key_1a invert + gkey3 ^= 0x80; // key_2a invert + } + if (state & 0x0002) + { + gkey1 ^= 0x01; // global_swap2 + gkey2 ^= 0x10; // key_7a invert + gkey3 ^= 0x01; // key_4b invert + } + if (state & 0x0004) + { + gkey1 ^= 0x80; // key_0b invert + gkey2 ^= 0x40; // key_6b invert + gkey3 ^= 0x04; // global_swap4 + } + if (state & 0x0008) + { + gkey1 ^= 0x20; // global_xor0 + gkey2 ^= 0x02; // key_6a invert + gkey3 ^= 0x20; // key_5a invert + } + if (state & 0x0010) + { + gkey1 ^= 0x02; // key_0c invert + gkey1 ^= 0x40; // key_5b invert + gkey2 ^= 0x08; // key_4a invert + } + if (state & 0x0020) + { + gkey1 ^= 0x08; // key_1b invert + gkey3 ^= 0x08; // key_3b invert + gkey3 ^= 0x10; // global_swap1 + } + if (state & 0x0040) + { + gkey1 ^= 0x10; // key_2b invert + gkey2 ^= 0x20; // global_swap0a + gkey2 ^= 0x04; // global_swap0b + } + if (state & 0x0080) + { + gkey2 ^= 0x01; // key_3a invert + gkey3 ^= 0x02; // key_0a invert + gkey3 ^= 0x40; // global_swap3 + } + + // for address xx0000-xx0006 (but only if >= 000008), use key xx2000-xx2006 + UINT8 mainkey; + if ((address & 0x0ffc) == 0 && address >= 4) + mainkey = main_key[(address & 0x1fff) | 0x1000]; + else + mainkey = main_key[address & 0x1fff]; + + UINT8 key_F; + if (address & 0x1000) key_F = BIT(mainkey,7); + else key_F = BIT(mainkey,6); + + // the CPU has been verified to produce different results when fetching opcodes + // from 0000-0006 than when fetching the inital SP and PC on reset. + if (vector_fetch) + { + if (address <= 3) gkey3 = 0x00; // supposed to always be the case + if (address <= 2) gkey2 = 0x00; + if (address <= 1) gkey1 = 0x00; + if (address <= 1) key_F = 0; + } + + UINT8 global_xor0 = 1^BIT(gkey1,5); + UINT8 global_xor1 = 1^BIT(gkey1,2); + UINT8 global_swap2 = 1^BIT(gkey1,0); + + UINT8 global_swap0a = 1^BIT(gkey2,5); + UINT8 global_swap0b = 1^BIT(gkey2,2); + + UINT8 global_swap3 = 1^BIT(gkey3,6); + UINT8 global_swap1 = 1^BIT(gkey3,4); + UINT8 global_swap4 = 1^BIT(gkey3,2); + + UINT8 key_0a = BIT(mainkey,0) ^ BIT(gkey3,1); + UINT8 key_0b = BIT(mainkey,0) ^ BIT(gkey1,7); + UINT8 key_0c = BIT(mainkey,0) ^ BIT(gkey1,1); + + UINT8 key_1a = BIT(mainkey,1) ^ BIT(gkey2,7); + UINT8 key_1b = BIT(mainkey,1) ^ BIT(gkey1,3); + + UINT8 key_2a = BIT(mainkey,2) ^ BIT(gkey3,7); + UINT8 key_2b = BIT(mainkey,2) ^ BIT(gkey1,4); + + UINT8 key_3a = BIT(mainkey,3) ^ BIT(gkey2,0); + UINT8 key_3b = BIT(mainkey,3) ^ BIT(gkey3,3); + + UINT8 key_4a = BIT(mainkey,4) ^ BIT(gkey2,3); + UINT8 key_4b = BIT(mainkey,4) ^ BIT(gkey3,0); + + UINT8 key_5a = BIT(mainkey,5) ^ BIT(gkey3,5); + UINT8 key_5b = BIT(mainkey,5) ^ BIT(gkey1,6); + + UINT8 key_6a = BIT(mainkey,6) ^ BIT(gkey2,1); + UINT8 key_6b = BIT(mainkey,6) ^ BIT(gkey2,6); + + UINT8 key_7a = BIT(mainkey,7) ^ BIT(gkey2,4); + + + if (val & 0x8000) // block invariant: val & 0x8000 != 0 + { + val = BITSWAP16(val, 15, 9,10,13, 3,12, 0,14, 6, 5, 2,11, 8, 1, 4, 7); + + if (!global_xor1) if (~val & 0x0800) val ^= 0x3002; // 1,12,13 + if (~val & 0x0020) val ^= 0x0044; // 2,6 + if (!key_1b) if (~val & 0x0400) val ^= 0x0890; // 4,7,11 + if (!global_swap2) if (!key_0c) val ^= 0x0308; // 3,8,9 + val ^= 0x6561; + + if (!key_2b) val = BITSWAP16(val,15,10,13,12,11,14,9,8,7,6,0,4,3,2,1,5); // 0-5, 10-14 + } + + if (val & 0x4000) // block invariant: val & 0x4000 != 0 + { + val = BITSWAP16(val, 13,14, 7, 0, 8, 6, 4, 2, 1,15, 3,11,12,10, 5, 9); + + if (!global_xor0) if (val & 0x0010) val ^= 0x0468; // 3,5,6,10 + if (!key_3a) if (val & 0x0100) val ^= 0x0081; // 0,7 + if (!key_6a) if (val & 0x0004) val ^= 0x0100; // 8 + if (!key_5b) if (!key_0b) val ^= 0x3012; // 1,4,12,13 + val ^= 0x3523; + + if (!global_swap0b) val = BITSWAP16(val, 2,14,13,12, 9,10,11, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3,15, 1, 0); // 2-15, 9-11 + } + + if (val & 0x2000) // block invariant: val & 0x2000 != 0 + { + val = BITSWAP16(val, 10, 2,13, 7, 8, 0, 3,14, 6,15, 1,11, 9, 4, 5,12); + + if (!key_4a) if (val & 0x0800) val ^= 0x010c; // 2,3,8 + if (!key_1a) if (val & 0x0080) val ^= 0x1000; // 12 + if (!key_7a) if (val & 0x0400) val ^= 0x0a21; // 0,5,9,11 + if (!key_4b) if (!key_0a) val ^= 0x0080; // 7 + if (!global_swap0a) if (!key_6b) val ^= 0xc000; // 14,15 + val ^= 0x99a5; + + if (!key_5b) val = BITSWAP16(val,15,14,13,12,11, 1, 9, 8, 7,10, 5, 6, 3, 2, 4, 0); // 1,4,6,10 + } + + if (val & 0xe000) // block invariant: val & 0xe000 != 0 + { + val = BITSWAP16(val,15,13,14, 5, 6, 0, 9,10, 4,11, 1, 2,12, 3, 7, 8); + + val ^= 0x17ff; + + if (!global_swap4) val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13, 6,11,10, 9, 5, 7,12, 8, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0); // 5-8, 6-12 + if (!global_swap3) val = BITSWAP16(val, 13,15,14,12,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0); // 15-14-13 + if (!global_swap2) val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11, 2, 9, 8,10, 6, 5, 4, 3, 0, 1, 7); // 10-2-0-7 + if (!key_3b) val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11,10, 4, 8, 7, 6, 5, 9, 1, 2, 3, 0); // 9-4, 3-1 + if (!key_2a) val = BITSWAP16(val, 13,14,15,12,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0); // 13-15 + + if (!global_swap1) val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12, 9, 8,11,10, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0); // 11...8 + if (!key_5a) val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8, 4, 5, 7, 6, 3, 2, 1, 0); // 7...4 + if (!global_swap0a) val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 0, 3, 2, 1); // 3...0 + } + + val = BITSWAP16(val, 12,15,14,13,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0); + + if ((val & 0xb080) == 0x8000) val ^= 0x4000; + if ((val & 0xf000) == 0xc000) val ^= 0x0080; + if ((val & 0xb100) == 0x0000) val ^= 0x4000; + + // mask out opcodes doing PC-relative addressing, replace them with FFFF + if ((m_masked_opcodes_lookup[key_F][val >> 4] >> ((val >> 1) & 7)) & 1) + val = 0xffff; + + return val; +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// decrypt - decrypt a buffers' worth of opcodes +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_device::decrypt(offs_t baseaddr, UINT32 size, const UINT16 *srcptr, UINT16 *opcodesptr, UINT8 state) +{ + for (offs_t offset = 0; offset < size; offset += 2) + opcodesptr[offset / 2] = decrypt_one((baseaddr + offset) / 2, srcptr[offset / 2], m_key, state, (baseaddr + offset) < 8); +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// default_state_change - handle state changes +// for standard cases +//------------------------------------------------- + +void fd1094_device::default_state_change(UINT8 state) +{ + m_decrypted_opcodes_bank->set_base(m_cache.decrypted_opcodes(state)); +} + + + +//************************************************************************** +// STATIC CALLBACKS +//************************************************************************** + +//------------------------------------------------- +// cmp_callback - callback for CMP.L instructions +// (state change) +//------------------------------------------------- + +WRITE32_MEMBER(fd1094_device::cmp_callback) +{ + if (offset == 0 && (data & 0x0000ffff) == 0x0000ffff) + change_state(data >> 16); +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// irq_callback - callback when the FD1094 enters +// interrupt code +//------------------------------------------------- + +IRQ_CALLBACK_MEMBER( fd1094_device::irq_callback ) +{ + change_state(STATE_IRQ); + return (0x60 + irqline * 4) / 4; // vector address +} + + +//------------------------------------------------- +// rte_callback - callback when an RTE instruction +// is encountered +//------------------------------------------------- + +WRITE_LINE_MEMBER(fd1094_device::rte_callback) +{ + change_state(STATE_RTE); +} |